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Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of endogenizing the equilibrium solution when a private –
domestic or foreign – firm competes in the quantities with a public, welfare maximizing firm.
Theoretical literature on mixed oligopolies, in fact, provides results and policy implications
that crucially rely on the notion of equilibrium assumed, either sequential or simultaneous.
In the framework of the endogenous timing model of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we show
that simultaneous play never emerges as the equilibrium of mixed duopoly games. We provide
sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibria.
These results are in sharp contrast with those obtained in private duopoly games in which
simultaneous play is the general result. We show that the key difference lies in the fact that
the objective of a welfare maximizing firm is generally increasing in the rival’s output, while
the contrary holds for private firms. We develop a comprehensive analysis of a mixed duopoly
considering both the cases of domestic and international competition, and the possible strategic
complementarity and substitutability. From a methodological viewpoint we make large use of
the basic results of the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid extraneous assumptions
such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the equilibria.
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1 Introduction
There are several important markets in which public firms compete with a small number of private
ones. Examples include the banking industry in several countries (postal banks in UK, Germany,
Italy, New Zealand), as well as TV broadcasting in most of the developed countries. Moreover,
health care services and insurance, transportation, energy, overnight delivery (also in the US)
are usually provided by state-owned enterprises in competition with private firms. In industrial
organization the term mixed oligopolies has been used to describe such imperfectly competitive
markets.
Theoretical literature began to devote closer attention to mixed oligopolies in the eighties of last
century when a privatization wave started in several industrialized countries and soon extended to
transition and developing economies. The aim of these works was to characterize the mixed oligopoly
equilibria and to study the welfare effect of privatization by adapting the standard oligopoly mod-
els to the presence of welfare maximizing firms. Results and policy prescriptions turned out to
crucially rely on the type of competition assumed (in quantity competition, for example, Cournot
or Stackelberg games). In de Fraja and Delbono (1989) it is shown that, if a Stackelberg game
with public leadership is played, privatization cannot improve welfare absent efficiency gains; on
the contrary, under Cournot competition, this may occur.
In another paper Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) show that welfare may be higher when the public
firm is the follower than when it is the leader in a Stackelberg game. In this way they provided an
argument against the standard view of the so-called Second-Best literature (see for example Rees,
1984; Bo¨s, 1986) that claimed the suboptimality of the marginal-cost pricing rule.1
During the last decade greater attention has been devoted to international mixed oligopolies,
in which a domestic public firm competes with foreign private firms.2 Again, results and policy
prescriptions over privatization depend on the type of competition assumed, either simultaneous-
move (Cournot) or sequential (Stackelberg) game.
More recently, a new trend has emerged, based on the idea that the order of play should result
from the players’ timing decisions. In many economic situations, in fact, it is often more reasonable
to assume that firms choose not only what action to take, but also when to take it.3
The aim of the present work is to contribute to this literature identifying the endogenous timing
equilibria of a mixed duopoly quantity game where a private – domestic or foreign – firm competes
with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We use the model of endogenous timing with observable
delay developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their model, a preplay stage is added to the
duopoly game, in which players simultaneously decide whether to move early or late in the basic
duopoly game. At the end of this stage, timing decisions are revealed and then the basic game is
played according to the announcements: if both choose the same timing, simultaneous game is then
played; if timing decisions are different, sequential play under perfect information – with the order
of moves as decided by the players – occurs. As a consequence, in the subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) of the extended game, the relevant equilibrium solution for the basic game endogenously
emerges.
Our main finding is that Cournot competition never arises as the equilibrium of the mixed
duopoly game when both firms are active on the market.
1See de Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a survey of these models.
2See for example the works of Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), Fjell and Heywood (2002).
3See Pal (1998), Matsumura (2003), Cornes and Sepahvand (2003) and Sepahvand (2004) for endogenous timing
games in mixed oligopolies.
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We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership Stack-
elberg equilibria in a comprehensive characterization of the mixed duopoly quantity game. We
consider the cases in which the private competitor is either domestic or foreign, and the possible
strategic complementarity and substitutability.
A domestic mixed duopoly differs from an international one since private firm’s profits are not
included in the public firm’s objective function in the latter case.
We show that when quantities are strategic substitute for both firms (i.e. best-response corre-
spondences are downward sloping) the Stackelberg equilibria with both private and public leadership
arise as the SPE of the endogenous timing game.
A sufficient condition to have downward sloping best-response correspondence for the private
firm is the log-concavity of the (inverse) demand function. For the public firm, the best-response
correspondence is always downward sloping in a domestic duopoly, while a necessary and sufficient
condition for this to occur in an international duopoly is the convexity of the demand function.
Note that these conditions hold true regardless of the cost functions of the two firms.
Our results have to be contrasted with those obtained in the private duopoly framework. Amir
and Grilo (1999) show that Cournot solution always emerge as the SPE when quantities are strategic
substitute for both firms, giving theoretical support to the general preference for Cournot over
Stackelberg games in the private oligopoly setting.
The main difference lies in the fact that the public firm’s objective is generally increasing in
private firm’s output, while the contrary is true for private firms.4
As a consequence, under strategic substitutability for both firms, the public firm’s output when
Stackelberg leader is smaller than the one in a simultaneous-move game. In fact, in order to induce
an increase in the rival’s output, the public leader produces less that in any Cournot equilibrium. So,
the private firm prefers to be follower than Cournot player and public leadership Pareto dominates
any Cournot equilibrium. The same is true for private leadership: in fact, the private firm produces
more when Stackelberg leader than under Cournot competition and the public firm prefers to be
follower than simultaneous player.
When the reaction correspondence of the private firm is increasing while strategic substitutability
holds for the public firm, private leadership is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game in
both domestic and international duopoly.5 In this case Pareto dominance of private leadership over
Cournot competition is again verified, while public leadership dominance is no longer true. In fact,
in order to have a larger private production with respect to simultaneous-move game, the public
leader produces more than under Cournot competition and the private firm’s profits are reduced.
Then, the private firm always prefers to move early and the best timing response of the public firm
is to move late.
In an international mixed duopoly a third case may occur. If the demand function is concave,
the best-response correspondence of the public firm is increasing while the private firm’s one is
decreasing. As a result, the Pareto dominance of the public leadership over Cournot competition
holds, while the private leadership solution does not Pareto dominate the simultaneous equilibria.
The latter is due to the fact that the private firm reduces its production when it is Stackelberg leader
with respect to the Cournot solutions. Then, the public firm always prefers to move early in order
to avoid private leadership, and public leadership emerges as the unique SPE of the endogenous
timing game.
4as we will see, the public firm’s objective is always increasing in the rival’s output in an international mixed
duopoly, while in a domestic duopoly this is true when the price is larger than the rival’s marginal cost.
5A sufficient condition is log-convexity of demand function and zero production costs for the private firm.
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From a methodological point of view, we make large use of the basic results of the theory
of supermodular games.6 These are also called games with strategic complementarities and are
characterized by the monotonicity of the best responses to rival’s action. The advantages of using
this approach are that no concavity assumptions are needed and nevertheless existence of pure-
strategy Cournot equilibria is guaranteed. Moreover we can deal with multiplicity of equilibria
since they can be preference-ranked for both private and public firms.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, the solution concept for
the endogenous timing, and the basic concepts of the supermodularity approach. Section 3 provides
the results for a domestic mixed duopoly, while Section 4 contains the analysis of an international
mixed duopoly. Section 5 briefly summarizes the conclusions. In Appendix A some intermediate
results are provided, while all the proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are collected in Appendix B.
2 The model
In this paper we consider a market in which one private, profit maximizing firm competes with a
public firm that maximizes domestic welfare. These firms, labeled respectively 1 and 0, compete in
quantities and their products are perfect substitutes. The market inverse demand function is P (·),
and the two cost functions are C1 (q1) and C0 (q0). The two firms’ profit functions are then
Π1 (q0, q1) = q1P (q0 + q1)− C1 (q1)
Π0 (q0, q1) = q0P (q0 + q1)− C0 (q0)
and consumer surplus is
CS (q0, q1) =
∫ q0+q1
0
P (z) dz − (q0 + q1)P (q0 + q1) .
Since the public firm’s objective function is social welfare, it depends on whether the private firm
is domestic or foreign. We shall analyze the two cases separately. If the private firm is domestic,
then the public firm maximizes
W d (q0, q1) , CS (q0, q1) + Π0 (q0, q1) + Π1 (q0, q1) =
∫ q0+q1
0
P (z) dz − C0 (q0)− C1 (q1) . (1)
If the private firm is foreign, the public firm’s objective is
W f (q0, q1) , CS (q0, q1) + Π0 (q0, q1) =
∫ q0+q1
0
P (z) dz − q1P (q0 + q1)− C0 (q0) . (2)
We define a mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium as a pair of (nonnegative) quantities
(
qC0 , q
C
1
)
such
that
W i
(
qC0 , q
C
1
) ≥W i (q0, qC1 ) and Π1 (qC0 , qC1 ) ≥ Π1 (qC0 , q1) ∀ q0, q1 ≥ 0; i = d, f.
Thus, in any mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium, each firm optimally replies to the action of the
rival and so
(
qC0 , q
C
1
)
must lie on the best-response correspondences of both firms. The latter are
defined in the standard way:
r0 (q1) , argmax
q0≥0
W i (q0, q1) i = d, f (3)
r1 (q0) , argmax
q1≥0
Π1 (q0, q1) . (4)
6This theory was initiated by Topkis (1978, 1979) and further developed by Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts
(1990), and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). We base our analysis on the main results of Novshek (1985) and Amir
(1996a) on the private Cournot duopoly.
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We denote the set of mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibria by C.
A Stackelberg equilibrium of this game corresponds to the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
of a two stage game of perfect information in which the second mover (follower) chooses an action
after having observed the action of the first mover (leader). A strategy for the leader is to pick a
quantity qi ≥ 0 and a strategy for the follower is ρj (qi), where ρj (·) is a mapping from the domain
of qi to the domain of qj . Assuming that firm 0 is the leader, a Stackelberg equilibrium of this
mixed duopoly game with public leadership is then a pair
(
ql0, ρ
∗
1 (·)
)
such that
W i
(
ql0, ρ
∗
1
(
ql0
)) ≥W i (q0, ρ∗1 (q0)) and Π1 (ql0, ρ∗1 (ql0)) ≥ Π1 (ql0, q1)
∀ q0, q1 ≥ 0; i = d, f
while a Stackelberg equilibrium with private leadership is a pair
(
ρ∗0 (·) , ql1
)
such that
Π1
(
ρ∗0
(
ql1
)
, ql1
) ≥ Π1 (ρ∗0 (q1) , q1) and W i (ρ∗0 (ql1) , ql1) ≥W i (q0, ql1)
∀ q0, q1 ≥ 0; i = d, f.
In other words, a Stackelberg equilibrium imposes that: (i) the strategy of the second mover is a
single-valued selection from its best-response correspondence; and (ii) the first mover chooses an
action that maximizes its objective function given the anticipation of the rival’s reaction.
Then, a Stackelberg equilibrium with public leadership is a pair
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
with qf1 ∈ r1
(
ql0
)
and ql0 ∈ argmax
q0≥0
W i (q0, r1 (q0)), while a Stackelberg equilibrium with private leadership is a pair(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
with qf0 ∈ r0
(
ql1
)
and ql1 ∈ argmax
q1≥0
Π1 (r0 (q1) , q1). We denote the set of Stackelberg
equilibria with public and private leadership by S0 and S1 respectively. Moreover, all the points in
Si must yield the same payoff to the leader (firm i).
The aim of this paper is to identify the appropriate sequencing of moves in a mixed duopoly
game. We investigate how the choice between simultaneous (Cournot) and sequential (Stackelberg)
games and the assignment of leader and follower roles in the latter case endogenously arise. To
this end, we adopt the simple model of extended game with observable delay due to Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990).
In this model, a preplay stage is added to the duopoly game. In this stage players simultaneously
decide whether to move early or late in the basic duopoly game. At the end of this stage, timing
decisions are revealed and the basic game is then played according to these announcements: if both
players choose the same timing, simultaneous (Cournot) game is played; while, if timing decisions
are different, sequential play under perfect information – with the order of moves as decided by
the players – occurs. As a consequence, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game
endogenously determines the relevant equilibrium concept for the basic game. In figure 1 the game
tree of the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) is depicted.
The following Proposition summarizes the results of the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) model
adapting it to the mixed duopoly setting. It characterizes the SPE of the extended game, that is a
pair of timing announcements and the equilibrium quantities in the basic game. For the time being,
we have to assume that leadership payoffs are strictly larger than any mixed Nash payoff and that
all equilibria exist. In next Sections we define conditions for existence of equilibria in the two cases
of domestic and foreign private firm, and show that in fact leader’s payoffs are always larger than
Nash payoff when both firms produces positive quantities.7
7The latter is always true when the reaction correspondence are continuous functions, but since in this model we
allow for discontinuities, we have to prove it.
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Figure 1: The extensive form of the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)’s model extended game with
observable delay.
Proposition 1 Consider a mixed-duopoly quantity game in which Cournot and Stackelberg equi-
libria with both order of moves exist. Assume that both firms strictly prefers the leader payoff to
any simultaneous play playoff. Then:
(i) if each firm’s Stackelberg follower payoff is smaller than its least preferred simultaneous play
payoff, then both firms decide to move early and Cournot equilibrium arises in any SPE of
the extended game;
(ii) if each firm’s Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than its most preferred simultaneous
play payoff, then Cournot equilibrium never arises in any SPE of the extended game and
sequential play with either orders of move is played;
(iii) if firm i’s Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than its most preferred simultaneous
play payoff and if firm j’s Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly smaller than its least preferred
Cournot payoff, then firm j moves early, firm i moves late and j-leadership arises in any SPE
of the extended game.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition follows easily from Theorems II, III and IV in Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990).
Throughout the paper we assume the following.
Assumption 1 The inverse demand function P (·) is twice continuously differentiable and positive
(in the relevant range) with P ′ (·) < 0 and limx→∞P (x) = 0.
Assumption 2 The cost functions C0 (·) and C1 (·) are strictly increasing and twice continuously
differentiable with Ci (0) = 0 ∀i = 0, 1.
Under these assumptions both firms’ action sets are compact since the firms never produce
quantities larger than some upper-bound. This is due to the fact that price is strictly decreasing to
0 and marginal costs are strictly positive. As a consequence, there exists a ki such that the outputs
(ki,∞) are strictly dominated strategies for firm i = 0, 1.
In this work we invoke the results of the theory of supermodular games and so we need conditions
on the primitives such that the players’ best responses are monotonic in rivals’ actions.
Topkis (1978) shows that F (x, y) : R2+ → R has the Increasing Difference Property or IDP
(Decreasing Difference Property or DDP) if ∀x′ ≥ x, y′ ≥ y
F (x′, y′)− F (x, y′) ≥ (≤)F (x′, y)− F (x, y)
5
Furthermore, F (x, y) has the Single-Crossing Property or SCP (dual SCP) if ∀x′ ≥ x, y′ ≥ y
F (x′, y′)− F (x, y′) ≥ (≤) 0⇐= F (x′, y)− F (x, y) ≥ (≤) 0
Both IDP and SCP imply that x∗(y) , argmax
x≥0
F (x, y) has a minimal selection x (.), and a maximal
selection x (.) that are non decreasing in y.8 On the other hand, DDP and dual SCP imply that
x∗(y) has x (.) and x (.) that are non increasing in y.
In the framework of the present paper, under Assumptions 1 and 2, we make use of stronger
results. Amir (1996b, Theorem 3) and Topkis (1998, p. 79) show that if ∂F (x,y)∂x is strictly increasing
(strictly decreasing) in y, then every selection of x∗ is strictly increasing (strictly decreasing) in y.
3 Endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with a domestic pri-
vate firm
In this section we consider the case in which the private firm is domestic, so that a social welfare
maximizing public firm includes private profits in its own objective, as defined in equation (1). We
prove that Cournot equilibrium never arises in any SPE of the endogenous timing game as long as
it does not coincide with both Stackelberg equilibria. The latter may occur only on the boundary,
when a monopolist solution arises.
Our results crucially relies on the effect of rival’s action on the objective of the firms. While the
private firm’s profits are strictly decreasing in the public firm’s quantity, welfare is nonmonotonic
in the output of the private firm. Nonetheless, as long as price is higher than the private firm’s
marginal cost, welfare is increasing in the private firm’s output. Indeed:
∂Π1 (q0, q1)
∂q0
= P ′ (q0 + q1) q1 < 0 ∀q0, q1 ≥ 0 (5)
∂W d (q0, q1)
∂q1
= P (q0 + q1)− C ′1 (q1) (6)
In the following Lemmas we state sufficient conditions for monotonicity of best responses when the
private firm is domestic.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, any selection of the public firm’s best-response correspon-
dence r0(q1) is strictly decreasing for every q1 ≥ 0 such that r0 (q1) > 0.
Lemma 3 In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2:
(a) Assume that either
P ′ (x) + xP ′′ (x) < 0 or P (x)P ′′ (x)− P ′2 (x) ≤ 0 ∀x ≥ 0
hold. Then every selection of the private firm’s best-response correspondence r1 (q0) is strictly
decreasing for every q0 ≥ 0 such that r1 (q0) > 0;
(b) Assume that C1 (q1) = 0 ∀q1 and P (·) is strongly log-convex everywhere, i.e.
P (x)P ′′ (x)− P ′2 (x) > 0.
Then every selection of the best-response correspondence r1 (q0) is strictly increasing.
8Note that IDP is a cardinal property of the function F , while SCP is an ordinal property.
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In what follows we first characterize the case in which the best-response correspondences are
decreasing for both firms.
Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, the mixed-duopoly quantity game is a su-
permodular game and the set C of pure strategy mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibria is nonempty.9
Under the same assumptions, Stackelberg equilibria with either public or private leadership exist
and the set S0 and S1 are nonempty.10
The following Theorem characterizes the SPE of the extended game when public and private
quantities are strategic substitutes for both firms.
Theorem 4 In addition to the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, assume that the public firm’s
cost function is convex in the relevant range. Then, Stackelberg equilibria with either order of
moves emerge in any SPE of the endogenous timing game. Mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium
never occurs in any SPE of the game except when it coincides with both Stackelberg equilibria. The
latter may occur only on the boundary, when a monopolist solution arises.
The intuition for this result is the following.
If the public firm is the leader, it produces a lower quantity than in any mixed-duopoly Cournot
equilibrium (point (ii) in Lemma 12). The reason is that in any Cournot equilibrium the public firm
does not take into account the strategic (negative) effects of its action on private firm’s production.
So, when this effect is taken into account, the public leader reduces its quantity, and the private
firm produces more than in any Cournot equilibrium. As a result, private profits are larger under
public leadership than under simultaneous competition.
When the private firm acts as leader, it increases its quantity with respect to any mixed-duopoly
Cournot equilibrium (point (i) in Lemma 12). In fact, it internalizes the strategic (negative) effects
of its action on the rival’s production and can increase profits by increasing its own output. The
public firm prefers to be the follower than to play simultaneously because the variation in welfare
has the same sign and larger magnitude of the variation in private firm’s profits, as far as we
compare two points on the public firm’s reaction correspondence.
The next Theorem analyzes the case in which the private firm’s reaction correspondence is
increasing in the rival’s output. Here we cannot invoke the results of the theory of supermodular
games, since the two reaction correspondences slope in opposite directions, implying that it is not
possible to re-order action sets in such a way that both reaction correspondences slope upward.
As a consequence, to guarantee existence of Cournot equilibria, we need to revert to the standard
approach for establishing existence of pure-strategy Cournot equilibrium, which requires strict quasi-
concavity of each firm’s objective function in own output to ensure single-valuedness and continuity
of the firms’ reaction functions. This is done via the sufficient conditions stated in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 5 Under the assumptions of point (b) in Lemma 3, the following sufficient conditions hold:
(a) The private firm’s profit function is quasi-concave in own output if 1/P (·) is a convex function,
i.e. if P (·)P ′′(·)− 2(P ′)2(·) < 0
9Following Vives (1990), reversing the natural order of the public firm’s action set, the game becomes supermodular
with effective strategy set [0, k0]× [0, k1]. By Tarski’s fixed point theorem the set C is not empty.
10Note that the effective action spaces are compact and the payoff functions are jointly continuous, so that the
follower’s best response correspondence has a closed graph. Then, as proved by Hellwig and Leininger (1987),
Stackelberg equilibria exist.
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(b) The public firm’s objective function is strictly concave in own output if P ′ (q0 + q1)−C ′′0 (q0) <
0.
Proof. The proof of part (a) is in Amir (2003, Appendix), while the proof of part (b) is
straightforward.
Theorem 6 Under the conditions of Lemma 5, r0 (.) and r1 (.) are single-valued continuous func-
tions strictly decreasing and increasing, respectively. Under interiority of the (unique) Cournot
equilibrium, private leadership always emerges in the SPE of the extended game.
In this case, differently from the one analyzed in Theorem 4, the strategic effect of public firm’s
action on private firm’s production is positive. So, taking into account this effect, the public leader
produces more than in the Cournot equilibrium. As a consequence, the private firm’s profits are
smaller under public leadership than in the Cournot equilibrium, and playing as follower is not an
equilibrium for the private firm. The private leadership equilibrium always arises in the SPE given
that the public firm prefers to be the follower for the very same reason as in Theorem 4.
4 Endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with a foreign pri-
vate firm
When the private firm is foreign, its profits are not included in the objective function of the public
firm, as defined in equation (2). Domestic welfare is strictly increasing in the rival’s output under
Assumptions 1 and 2 since
∂W f (q0, q1)
∂q1
= −q1P ′ (q0 + q1) > 0 ∀q0, q1 ≥ 0. (7)
This result simplifies the analysis with respect to the case of a domestic private firm. Nonetheless,
the central result of the previous Section is confirmed: simultaneous play never occurs in any SPE
of the endogenous timing game.
The next Lemma states sufficient conditions for monotonicity of the public firm’s best-response
correspondence, while Lemma 3 still holds for the private firm.
Lemma 7 Under the standard assumptions, any selection of the public firm’s best-response corre-
spondence r0 (q1) is strictly decreasing (strictly increasing) as long as P ′′ (x) > (<)0 ∀x ≥ 0.
Note that it never occurs that both firms have nondecreasing best-response correspondences.
In fact, by point (b) of Lemma 3, P ′′ (·) > 0 is a necessary condition to have a strictly increasing
private firm’s best response. But P ′′ (·) > 0 implies that the public firm’s best response is downward
sloping.
In what follows, we first characterize the case in which both best-response correspondences are
strictly decreasing in the interior. As in the previous Section, this is a sufficient condition for the
game to be supermodular and to have the existence results for both mixed-duopoly Cournot and
Stackelberg equilibria. The following Theorem characterizes the SPE of the extended game with
strategic substitutability for both firms.
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Theorem 8 Under the assumptions of point (a) of Lemma 3 and if P ′′ (·) > 0 ∀q0, q1 ≥ 0, then
Stackelberg equilibria with either order of moves arise in any SPE of the endogenous timing game.
Mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium never emerges in any SPE of the game except when it coincides
with both Stackelberg equilibria. The latter may occur only on the boundary, when a monopolist
solution arises.
The next Theorem analyzes the case in which the private firm’s best-response correspondence
is increasing in the rival’s output. As in the previous Section, the game is not supermodular. We
need again to assume quasi-concavity of welfare in public firm’s quantity.
Theorem 9 Under the assumptions of point (b) of Lemma 3, the private firm’s reaction correspon-
dence slopes upward and the reaction correspondence of the public firm slopes downward. With the
assumptions of Lemma 5 in addition, welfare is concave in public firm’s output. Assume also an
interior equilibrium. Then, private leadership always emerge in the SPE of the extended game.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 6
To see that welfare is concave in own output, note that
∂2W
∂q20
= (P ′ − C ′′0 )− q1P ′′ < 0
since it is the sum of two negative terms (here, P ′′ > 0 by log-convexity).
When the private firm is foreign, the public firm may have a reaction correspondence that slopes
upward, as proved by point (b) of Lemma 7. As in the previous case, the game is not supermodular
and then further assumptions are needed to ensure existence. In the following Theorem we show
that public leadership is the unique equilibrium of the extended game.
Theorem 10 Under the assumption of point (b) in Lemma 7, the public firm best-response cor-
respondence is increasing. Assume that the objective functions of both firms are quasi-concave in
their own action and that an interior Cournot equilibrium exists. Then public leadership always
emerge in the SPE of the endogenous timing game.
5 Conclusion
Our main result is that Cournot equilibria never arise in the endogenous timing equilibrium of the
mixed duopoly game as far as both firms produce positive quantities.
When quantities are strategic substitute for both firms the two Stackelberg equilibria arise in
the SPE of the endogenous timing game.
When this is not the case, and one firm has upward sloping best response, then there is a unique
equilibrium with this firm being the leader in the Stackelberg game.
Using the natural and simple endogenous time scheme of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), our
results provide a justification to the use of the Stackelberg concept of equilibrium in mixed duopolies.
If we couple this claim with the results in the private duopoly framework provided by Amir
and Grilo (1999), where the Cournot solution is the general outcome, we gain new insights on
9
the effect of privatization. The change in the objective of the former public firm is not the sole
effect of privatization. In fact, when it is more reasonable to assume that firms choose not only
what action to take, but also when to take them, also the timing of the game changes. Since
the Stackelberg equilibria dominates Cournot solutions in terms of welfare, any positive effect of
privatization derived under the assumption of a given timing of the game is weakened.
The striking difference between the result obtained in the mixed duopoly and in the private
duopoly is entirely explained by the fact that the objective function of a public firm is generally
increasing in the rival’s output, while the opposite is true for a private firm.
Appendix A
This Appendix contains some intermediate results that are necessary to the proof of the main
theorems of the paper.
Lemma 11 Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, the set C includes a point
(
q
0
, q1
)
where the private firm produces its largest output and the public firm produces its smallest output
in the set C. A sufficient condition for
(
q
0
, q1
)
to be the Pareto dominant mixed-duopoly Cournot
equilibrium is that the public firm’s cost function is convex in the relevant range.
Proof. Reversing the natural order of the public firm action set, the set C has a largest Cournot
equilibrium in the new order, which is clearly
(
q
0
, q1
)
.11 We show that this is the most preferred
Cournot equilibrium by both private and public firms. Consider any other (q̂0, q̂1) ∈ C different
from
(
q
0
, q1
)
. By the extremal nature of
(
q
0
, q1
)
and by Lemma 2 and point (a) of Lemma 3 it
follows that q
0
< q̂0 and q1 > q̂1.
(i) For the private firm the following relation holds:
Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ Π1
(
q
0
, q̂1
)
> Π1 (q̂0, q̂1) (8)
where the first inequality derives from q1 being best response to q0, and the second inequality
is due to private firm’s objective being strictly decreasing in q0.
(ii) For the public firm, given that both (q̂0, q̂1) and
(
q
0
, q1
)
lay on GR r0 (q1), it follows that12
W d
(
q
0
, q1
)
−W d (q̂0, q̂1) =
∫ q1
bq1
dW d (r0 (q1) , q1)
dq1
dq1 =
∫ q1
bq1
∂W d (r0 (q1) , q1)
∂q1
dq1 (9)
where the latter equality derives from the application of the envelope theorem. Therefore, it
is possible to show that the following relation holds:
∂W d (r0 (q1) , q1)
∂q1
= P (r0 (q1) + q1)− C ′1 (q1) >
P (r0 (q1) + q1)− C ′1 (q1) + (1 + r′0 (q1))P ′ (r0 (q1) + q1) q1 =
dΠ1 (r0 (q1) , q1)
dq1
In fact, under the assumption of convex cost for the public firm, its reaction correspondence
is a contraction; i.e. −1 ≤ r′0 (q1) ≤ 0,∀q1 ≥ 0. Then:∫ q1
bq1
∂W d (r0 (q1) , q1)
∂q1
dq1 >
∫ q1
bq1
dΠ1 (r0 (q1) , q1)
dq1
dq1 = Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
−Π1 (q̂0, q̂1) > 0
11See Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 5)).
12GR stays for the graph of the best-reply function ri (·).
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where the latter inequality comes from the result in (8).
This completes the proof.13
Lemma 12 Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, the output of the private firm (public
firm) in any Stackelberg game with both orders of moves is never smaller (never larger) than in the
Pareto-dominant mixed duopoly Cournot equilibrium.
Proof. We have to distinguish the two cases of (i) private leadership, and (ii) public leadership.
(i) Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a point
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
∈ S1 such that ql1 < q1. Since
both
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
and
(
q
0
, q1
)
lay on GR r0(.), it follows that q
f
0 > q0. Then:
Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ Π1
(
q
0
, ql1
)
> Π1
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
(10)
where the first inequality is due to q1 being best response to q0 and the second by the fact
that Π1 (.) is strictly decreasing in q0. Inequality (10) contradicts the nature of Stackelberg
equilibria and so it is always the case that ql1 ≥ q1 and qf0 ≤ q0.
(ii) Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a point
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
∈ S0 such that qf1 < q1. The first
intermediate result is that
W d
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
≤W d
(
r0
(
qf1
)
, qf1
)
(11)
since r0
(
qf1
)
is a best response. Moreover, given that both
(
r0
(
qf1
)
, qf1
)
and
(
q
0
, q1
)
lay
on GR r0 (.), we can apply the envelope theorem as in equation (9) and obtain the following
relation between welfare and profits:
W d
(
q
0
, q1
)
−W d
(
r0
(
qf1
)
, qf1
)
> Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
−Π1
(
r0
(
qf1
)
, qf1
)
> 0 (12)
The latter inequality come from the fact that
Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ Π1
(
q
0
, qf1
)
> Π1
(
r0
(
qf1
)
, qf1
)
where the first inequality comes from q1 being best response to q0, and the second is due to
the fact that Π1 (.) is strictly decreasing in q0 and r0
(
qf1
)
> q
0
.14 So, combining inequalities
(11) and (12), whenever qf1 < q1the following relation holds
W d
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
≤W d
(
r0
(
qf1
)
, qf1
)
< W d
(
q
0
, q1
)
that contradicts the nature of Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore, it must be that qf1 ≥ q1and
ql0 ≤ q0.
13Note that this result has the obvious extension that all the mixed duopoly Cournot equilibria can be Pareto
ranked from the smallest to the largest in the reversed order. A similar result is obtained by (Milgrom and Roberts,
1990, Theorem 7) for 2-player supermodular games when both objectives are monotonic in the rival’s action. Since
the public firm’s objective has not this property, we have developed a novel methodology to make comparative statics
in the framework of a (domestic) mixed duopoly.
14Since both
“
r0
“
qf1
”
, qf1
”
and
“
q
0
, q1
”
lay on GR r0 (.) and given the contradiction hypothesis that q
f
1 < q1, it
follows that r0
“
qf1
”
> q
0
because any selection of r0 (.) is strictly decreasing.
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This completes the proof.
Lemma 13 Under the assumptions of point (a) in Lemma 3, the payoff of the leader in any Stack-
elberg equilibrium is strictly larger than in any Cournot equilibrium as far as the Pareto dominant
Cournot equilibrium is interior.
Proof. If
(
q
0
, q1
)
is interior, the following first-order conditions for public and private firms
must hold:
∂W d
(
q
0
, q1
)
∂q0
= 0;
∂Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
∂q1
= 0
We now analyze the two Stackelberg games.
(i) If
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
∈ S1 is also interior, then the following first-order condition for the private leader
must hold:
∂Π1
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
∂q1
+
∂Π1
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
∂q0
r′0
(
ql1
)
= 0
where r′0
(
ql1
)
is a Dini derivate.15 Since
∂Π1(q0,q1)
∂q0
< 0 by equation (5), and r′0
(
ql1
)
< 0 in the
interior by point (a) of Lemma 3, it follows that
∂Π1(qf0 ,ql1)
∂q1
< 0 in any interior point, and the
fact that
(
q
0
, q1
)
6∈ S1 directly follows. If
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
is not interior, then the conclusion follows
from the interiority of
(
q
0
, q1
)
.
(ii) Considering public leadership, if
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
∈ S0 is also interior, the following first-order condition
for the public leader must hold:
∂W d
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
∂q0
+
∂W d
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
∂q1
r′1
(
ql0
)
= 0.
Since the point
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
lies on r1
(
ql0
)
, the following first-order condition of the private firm
holds:
P (q0 + r1 (q0)) + r1 (q0)P ′ (q0 + r1 (q0))− C ′1 (r1 (q0)) = 0
Then, in
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
the price is strictly above the private firm’s marginal cost and it follows that
∂Wd(ql0,qf1 )
∂q1
> 0. Being
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
interior, r′1
(
ql0
)
< 0 and we have the result that
∂Wd(ql0,qf1 )
∂q0
>
0. This implies that
(
q
0
, q1
)
6∈ S0. If
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
is not interior, then the conclusion follows from
the interiority of
(
q
0
, q1
)
.
This completes the proof.
15The four Dini derivates are the lim sup and lim inf of the one-sided (left and right) directional slopes starting at
any point and always exist in the extended reals.
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Appendix B
This Appendix includes all the proofs of the paper.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the public firm maximizes total welfare as defined in equation (1),
its objective has DDP since
∂2W d (q0, q1)
∂q0∂q1
= P ′ (q0 + q1) < 0 ∀q0, q1 ≥ 0.
So, under the standard assumptions, any selection of the best-response correspondence of the public
firm is strictly decreasing.
Proof of Lemma 3.
a) Following Novshek (1985), the private firm’s objective has DDP when
∂2Π1 (q0, q1)
∂q0∂q1
= P ′ (q0 + q1) + q1P ′′ (q0 + q1) < 0 ∀q0, q1 ≥ 0
which is equivalent to
P ′ (x) + xP ′′ (x) < 0 ∀x ≥ 0
while a sufficient condition for the dual SSCP is
P (x)P ′′ (x)− P ′2 (x) ≤ 0 ∀x ≥ 0
as defined in Amir (1996a). If one of these conditions holds, then any selection of the private
firm’s best-response correspondence is strictly decreasing.
b) Since the production costs of the private firm are zero, its objective reduces to q1P (q0 + q1).
Given that logP (·) is convex by assumption, it follow that the objective is logsupermodular,
i.e.
∂2 log q1P (q0 + q1)
∂q0∂q1
=
P (q0 + q1)P ′′ (q0 + q1)− P ′2 (q0 + q1)
P 2 (q0 + q1)
> 0.
So, every selection of the private firm best-response correspondence is strictly increasing.16
Proof of Theorem 4. To prove this result we need to show that both firms prefer the follower
outcome to any simultaneous play solution.
(i) By point (i) of Lemma 12 we know that any
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
∈ S1 is such that qf0 ≤ q0 and ql1 ≥
q1. Moreover, from the definitions of Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria, both
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
and(
q
0
, q1
)
lay on GR r0 (q1). Then, we can apply the envelope theorem and obtain the following
relation between welfare and profits:
W d
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
−W d
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ Π1
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
−Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ 0 (13)
where the latter inequality comes from the property of Stackelberg equilibria (Lemma 13), and
it is strict whenever
(
q
0
, q1
)
is interior.
16See Amir and Grilo (1999)
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(ii) By point (i) of Lemma 12 we know that any
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
∈ S0 is such that ql0 ≤ q0 and q
f
1 ≥ q1.
Then it follows that
Π1
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
≥ Π1
(
ql0, q1
) ≥ Π1 (q0, q1) (14)
where the first inequality comes from the fact that qf1 is best response to q
l
0 and the second
is due to the private firm’s objective being decreasing in q0. Note that the latter inequality is
strict whenever ql0 < q0 that is always true when
(
q
0
, q1
)
is interior, by Lemma 13.
The conditions of point (ii) of Proposition 1 hold and both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE of
the endogenous timing game.
The last remark is about the boundary solutions. By Lemma 12, If q
0
= 0, then both private
and public leadership equilibria always coincide with
(
q
0
, q1
)
. This is not necessary when q1 = 0;
in fact, it may well be the case that (one or both) Stackelberg equilibria do not coincide with(
q
0
, q1
)
. So, in the first case, Cournot and both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE of the endogenous
timing game. It is straightforward to see that all the equilibria coincide with the private monopoly
solution. In the latter case, Cournot is a SPE if and only if both public and private leadership
equilibria coincide with
(
q
0
, q1
)
, that is the public monopoly solution.
Proof of Theorem 6. By quasi-concavity of both objectives, the reaction correspondences
of both firms are single-valued and continuous. Moreover the reaction correspondence of the public
firm is strictly decreasing when interior. Hence, the mixed duopoly Cournot equilibrium
(
q
0
, q1
)
is unique. We now prove that: (i) the private firm’s payoff is strictly larger in the Cournot than in
the public leadership equilibrium; while (ii) the public firm is better off in the private leadership
than in the mixed-duopoly Cournot equilibrium.
(i) By point (ii) in Lemma 12
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
∈ S0 is such that qf1 > q1. Since
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
and
(
q
0
, q1
)
lie
on r1, that is strictly increasing in the interior, it follows that ql0 > q0. As a consequence, we
can rank private firm’s payoffs in the following way:
Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ Π1
(
q
0
, qf1
)
> Π1
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
where the first inequality follows from the property of Cournot equilibria and the second from
the fact that Π1 is strictly decreasing in q0. Then, the private firm strictly prefers Cournot
to public leadership equilibria.
(ii) We now analyze the private firm’s leadership equilibrium
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
∈ S1. From the interiority
assumption, as show in point (i) of Lemma 13, the following relation holds:
Π1
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
> Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ Π1
(
q
0
, ql1
)
.
Hence, qf0 < q0 and q
l
1 > q1 because r0 is strictly decreasing in the interior. Then, applying
the same analysis as in point (i) of Theorem 4, it follows that
W
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
> W
(
q
0
, q1
)
.
The conditions of point iii) of Proposition 1 hold and the private leadership equilibrium is the
unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
14
Proof of Lemma 7. A sufficient condition to have W f (q0, q1) strictly supermodular (strict
submodular) is ∂
2W f (q0,q1)
∂q0∂q1
> (<)0. Since
∂2W (q0, q1)
∂q0∂q1
= −q1P ′′ (q0 + q1)
a sufficient condition for every selection of r0 (.) to be strictly increasing (strictly decreasing in the
interior is P ′′ (q0 + q1) < (>)0.
Proof of Theorem 8. First of all we show that there exist a Pareto dominant mixed-duopoly
Cournot equilibrium. As in Lemma 11, the set C includes a point
(
q
0
, q1
)
where the private firm
produces its largest output and the public firm produces its smallest output in the set C. This
is the most preferred simultaneous equilibrium by both firms since, ∀ (q̂0, q̂1) ∈ C different from(
q
0
, q1
)
, we have that q
0
< q̂0 and q1 > q̂1. Then, it is possible to show that:
Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ Π1
(
q
0
, q̂1
)
> Π1 (q̂0, q̂1) (15)
W f
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ W f (q̂0, q1) > W f (q̂0, q̂1) (16)
Relation (15) is in fact the same as (8) in Lemma 11. In relation (16) the first inequality is due to
the fact that q
0
is a best response to q1 and the latter derives from W f (.) being strictly increasing
in q1.
Moreover, by point (i) in Lemma 12 any
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
∈ S1 is such that ql1 ≥ q1 and qf0 ≤ q0. It is
easy to show that any
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
∈ S0 is such that qf1 ≥ q1and ql0 ≤ q0. Suppose not: if there exists
a
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
∈ S0 such that qf1 < q1 the following relation holds:
W f
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
≤W f
(
r0
(
qf1
)
, qf1
)
< W f
(
r0
(
qf1
)
, q1
)
≤W f
(
q
0
, q1
)
where the first and the third inequality come from the fact that r0
(
qf1
)
and q
0
are best response
to qf1 and q1, respectively; while the second inequality is due to W
f being strictly increasing in q1.
Now we show that both firms prefer the follower outcome to the Pareto dominant Cournot
equilibrium.
For the private firm the following relation holds:
Π1
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
≥ Π1
(
ql0, q1
) ≥ Π1 (q0, q1)
where the first inequality comes from the fact that qf1 is best response to q
l
0 and the second is due to
the private firm’s objective being decreasing in q0. Note that the latter inequality is strict whenever
ql0 < q0, that is always true when
(
q
0
, q1
)
is interior.
For the public firm the following relation holds:
W f
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
≥W f
(
q
0
, ql1
)
≥W f
(
q
0
, q1
)
where the first inequality is due to qf0 being best response to q
l
1, and the second derives from the
fact that W is increasing in q1, and it is strict whenever
(
q
0
, q1
)
is interior.
Then, the conditions of point (ii) of Proposition 1 hold and both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE
of the endogenous timing game.
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The same analysis as in Theorem 4 applies to corner solutions.
Proof of Theorem 10. By quasi-concavity of both W f (.) and Π1 (.), the best-response
correspondences are single-valued. Moreover, r0 (q1) is strictly increasing and r1 (q0) is strictly
decreasing in the interior. Hence, the Cournot equilibrium
(
q
0
, q1
)
is unique. Since
(
q
0
, q1
)
is
interior by assumption, the following inequalities hold:
W f
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
> W f
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥W f (ql0, q1) .
Then, qf1 > q1; and, since
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
and
(
q
0
, q1
)
lie on r1, it follows that ql0 < q0. As a consequence,
we can rank private firm’s payoffs in the following way:
Π1
(
ql0, q
f
1
)
≥ Π1
(
ql0, q1
)
> Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that qf1 is a best response to q
l
0 and the second
from the fact that Π1 is strictly decreasing in q0. Then, the private firm strictly prefers the public
leadership to the Cournot equilibrium.
From the interiority assumptions we can show that for
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
∈ S1
Π1
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
> Π1
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥ Π1
(
q
0
, ql1
)
Hence, qf0 < q0; and, by the fact that both points
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
and
(
q
0
, q1
)
lie on r0, it follows that
ql1 < q1 . It is easy to show that:
W f
(
q
0
, q1
)
≥W f
(
qf0 , q1
)
> W f
(
qf0 , q
l
1
)
.
In fact, the first inequality follows from the fact that q
0
is best response to q1 and the second is
consequence of W f
(
qf0 , q1
)
being strictly increasing in q1.
The conditions of point iii) of Proposition 1 hold and the public leadership is the unique SPE
of the endogenous timing game.
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